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THE ALASKA HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS ACT, ANALYZED
KENNETH C. KIRK*
This Article reviews and examines the Alaska Health Care
Decisions Act (“AHCDA”), found at section 13.52 of the Alaska
Statutes and effective January 1, 2005. The AHCDA is examined
functionally, historically, philosophically, and by hypothetical
application to well-known cases. The Article identifies a number
of errors and ambiguities in the AHCDA and concludes that while
the AHCDA expresses itself as an attempt to balance the societal
concerns of sanctity of life and the right to self-determination, in
practice it is likely to promote termination of life support in
circumstances supported by neither of those two philosophical
imperatives.

I. INTRODUCTION
After four years of debate, the 2004 Alaska Legislature finally
1
passed the Alaska Health Care Decisions Act (“AHCDA”). The
AHCDA is an ambitious attempt to pull together a number of
statutory schemes related to the end of life, including laws on
advance directives (also known as “living wills”), termination of life
support for those who are terminally ill or permanently
unconscious, laws related to decision making for the mentally ill,
and laws related to organ donation. The AHCDA also adds a
section on surrogate decision making for those who have not filled
out an advance medical directive and have no court-appointed
guardian. The AHCDA includes an optional form called an
advance healthcare directive, which can be used to appoint a
decision maker for healthcare decisions in the event a person is
2
incapacitated. The advance healthcare directive also provides
instructions for healthcare, including decisions to withdraw life
Copyright © 2005 Kenneth C. Kirk. This Article is also available on the Internet
at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/alr.
* Attorney in private practice with Kenneth Kirk & Associates, Anchorage,
Alaska; J.D., The Cornell Law School, 1987; B.A., University of Alaska,
Anchorage, 1983.
1. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52 (2004).
2. § 13.52.300.

213

110805 03_KIRK.DOC

214

1/3/2006 4:50 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[22:2

support (which includes feeding tubes); changes the system for
making anatomical gifts at death; allows appointment of a
surrogate decision maker for mental health treatment; and
indicates the physician who will have the right, under certain
3
circumstances, to make decisions on a patient’s behalf.
This Article will examine the AHCDA from several different
perspectives. Part II reviews the AHCDA functionally, with an
emphasis on what its various parts achieve and how well these parts
fit together. Part III culls the legislative history to show how the
bill evolved from a “Five Wishes” statement to its current form.
Part IV examines the AHCDA from a philosophical perspective,
showing how the various emphases on sanctity of life, right to selfdetermination, and quality of life have been factored, albeit
somewhat unevenly, into the Act. Part V applies the AHCDA to
the well-known cases involving Karen Ann Quinlan, Nancy
Cruzan, Terri Schiavo, Sun Hudson, and Ora Mae Magouirk to see
how those cases would likely have come out under the AHCDA.
Finally, Part VI considers the likely practical effects of the
AHCDA, analyzing whether the probable results are in fact
consistent with the aims on which the AHCDA purports to be
based.
II. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
The Health Care Decisions Act is a hybrid enactment,
covering a number of different areas relating to decision making on
medical issues.
The AHCDA’s most distinctive attribute is the new advance
healthcare directive form, with the activating portion at the
4
beginning of the statute, and the optional form itself at the
5
conclusion (except for the definitions). Under the old living will
6
statute, a terminally ill individual could direct that his attending
physician withhold or withdraw procedures that merely prolonged
the dying process and were not necessary to keep him comfortable
7
and to relieve pain. The individual could also make an organ
8
donation on the same document or separately. Under the new
form, in a single document, the individual can designate an agent to
make healthcare decisions if he or she becomes incapacitated; can

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
§ 13.52.010.
§ 13.52.300.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010–.100 (2002) (repealed 2004).
§ 18.12.010(a) (repealed 2004).
§ 13.50.030 (repealed 2004).
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limit that agent’s authority; can indicate, when the person has a
“qualifying condition,”9 whether life should be prolonged by
artificial means, artificial nutrition or hydration, or whether pain
relief should be provided; can direct an anatomical gift at death,
and even what types of use to which the gift can be made; can
delegate authority for mental health treatment; and can designate a
10
primary physician for decision-making purposes. The AHCDA
provides details regarding how the form must be witnessed, when it
11
is effective, what the agent must consider in making decisions on
the person’s behalf, and how it may be revoked, among other
limitations.
Noticeably, the statutes related to guardianship were not
12
incorporated into the AHCDA, but were instead left in Title 13.
However, several portions of the AHCDA do relate to guardians.
Under the guardianship statutes, a person nominated by the
13
respondent has priority to be selected as guardian, and under the
AHCDA the form may include the individual’s nomination of a
14
guardian; thus, the AHCDA provides a method for nominating
the person who will be given priority under the guardianship
statutes. The sample form, if left unaltered, simply nominates the
person who is designated to make healthcare decisions as the
15
guardian. Note, however, that under the guardianship statutes, a
general guardian has a great deal of authority with regard to
finances (assuming a separate conservator has not been appointed),
and a different person might be better able to handle those duties.
As a result, patients are advised to consider carefully the decision
to designate a healthcare agent that will also act as the preferred
guardian. Separating the functions of healthcare agent and
guardian would require writing a separate instruction on the form,
as the appointment of a guardian is otherwise automatic in the last
paragraph of Part One of the statutory form.
Interestingly, absent a court order to the contrary, a healthcare
16
decision made by an agent takes precedence over that of a

9. Defined as either a condition of permanent unconsciousness or a terminal
condition. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.300 (2004).
10. Id.
11. § 13.52.010(f). The form is only effective during the time the principal
lacks capacity. Id.
12. §§ 13.26.090–.155.
13. § 13.26.145(d)(1).
14. § 13.52.010(j).
15. § 13.52.300 pt. 1(5).
16. An “agent” refers to one appointed under an advance healthcare directive.
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guardian,17 and the guardian is required to comply with the ward’s
healthcare directive unless a court expressly authorizes the
revocation. Attorneys who represent petitioners in guardianship
cases have already noticed the potential malpractice trap;
consequently, they now draft proposed orders for the court so that
their guardians will be able to act according to their own
perceptions of the ward’s best interest and will not be overruled by
an appointed agent. To understand the problem, imagine that you
are the attorney for the petitioner in a guardianship case, and your
client has asked you to secure guardianship over a relative with
dementia, in part so that reasonable healthcare decisions can be
made. In your proposed orders, which are ultimately adopted by
the court, you neglect to state clearly that the guardian’s decisions
will overrule any decisions by an agent (probably because you are
using the same forms you used in the past, when this was not an
issue). On the eve of an important medical procedure, you
discover that the ward has a pre-existing, valid healthcare directive,
naming another individual as the agent. The agent will not consent
to the medical procedure, so it cannot be performed. The
malpractice risk in that scenario should be apparent.
In recognition of the fact that a significant portion of the
population does not, and will not, have advance directives, the
AHCDA includes a detailed provision allowing for the
appointment of surrogates for individuals who do not have advance
18
healthcare directives or guardians. A patient can designate such a
surrogate by personally informing the supervising healthcare
19
providers of the identity of the desired surrogate. If the patient
fails to do so, a surrogate is appointed according to a priority list,
beginning with the patient’s spouse, then adult children, then
parents, then adult siblings, and finally “an adult who has exhibited
special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the
20
patient’s personal values, and who is reasonably available.” The
surrogate is to act in accordance with the patient’s individual
instructions and wishes; otherwise, the surrogate may make the
decision in accordance with his or her determination of the
21
patient’s best interest, considering the patient’s personal values.
The patient’s primary healthcare provider may overrule the

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

§ 13.52.040(b).
§ 13.52.030.
§ 13.52.030(c).
§ 13.52.030(d).
§ 13.52.030(g).
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surrogate’s decision if it appears that he or she is not abiding by the
wishes, values, and best interests of the patient.22
The AHCDA has specific restrictions on when life support
(including the withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration)
may be withheld or withdrawn. The patient must have a
“qualifying condition,” which means either a terminal condition or
23
a state of permanent unconsciousness. However, the standards
for do-not-resuscitate orders (commonly called “DNR” or
“Comfort One” orders) are different under the AHCDA.
Specifically, the order must be entered by a physician and does not
require the consent of the patient, agent, guardian, surrogate, or
24
family.
The rules on anatomical gifts (also known as “organ
donation”) primarily involve two different sections of the
AHCDA. The first, section 13.52.170, allows the patient to make
25
The second, section
an anatomical gift in a variety of ways.
13.52.180, allows other individuals (again, according to a priority
list) to make anatomical gifts on the patient’s behalf, unless the
26
patient had previously and specifically objected. The statute also
27
provides a form for a third party to make the gift, and other
sections of the statute attempt to sort out the necessary details and
28
prevent abuses.
29
Finally, there are the mental health provisions. Part Four of
the optional form directive allows an individual to make a variety
of decisions about mental health treatment, including whether he
or she consents to administration of psychotropic medications,
30
electroconvulsive treatment, or mental health commitment. The
remaining mental health provisions, for the most part, carve out

22. § 13.52.030(h).
23. § 13.52.390(36).
24. § 13.52.065.
25. § 13.52.170.
26. § 13.52.180.
27. § 13.52.190.
28. §§ 13.52.200–.270.
29. Whether mental health treatment even falls within the AHCDA depends
on whether the AHCDA is viewed as primarily related to medical care or to endof-life issues. If the AHCDA is aimed at medical care in general, including mental
health treatment, this part of the statute makes sense. But, if one thinks of the
AHCDA as related primarily to questions surrounding the end-of-life, the section
on mental health treatment does not fit at all.
30. § 13.52.300, pt. 4.
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exceptions to the general rules applicable to other medical
treatments.31
Most of the laws related to mental health commitments are not
32
in the AHCDA, but rather in section 47.30 of the Alaska Statutes,
which covers involuntary mental health commitments. Under the
involuntary commitment statute, an individual can be committed
by a peace officer, a psychiatrist or other physician, or a
33
psychologist; the AHCDA adds the designated healthcare agent
34
to the list of people who can initially order a commitment.
Additionally, under the AHCDA, the agent can commit the patient
35
for up to seventeen days, whereas the statute on involuntary
commitments mandates a probable cause hearing within three
36
days.
The mental health portion of the advance directive itself is
nothing new; indeed, it is lifted word-for-word from the old statute,
which was titled “Personal Declaration of Preference for Mental
37
Health Treatment” and was repealed effective the same day the
38
AHCDA took effect. Both forms allow the agent to make the
decisions on psychotropic medication, electroconvulsive treatment,
39
and involuntary commitment for up to seventeen days.
Curiously, under Part Four of the AHCDA’s form, the default
rule is that the healthcare agent can make mental health decisions
40
on behalf of the patient. Consequently, there is a risk that those
who do not read the form carefully or check off the boxes
indicating non-consent will inadvertently give the agent the
authority to consent to highly invasive and controversial mental

31. E.g., § 13.52.020(a)–(c) (outlining exceptions to the general rules regarding
revocation of a directive); § 13.52.030 (relating to surrogates); § 13.52.120(f)
(regarding commitments to mental health facilities).
32. §§ 47.30.700–.815.
33. § 47.30.705.
34. § 13.52.300.
35. Id.
36. § 47.30.715.
37. ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.950–.980 (2002) (repealed 2004).
38. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.300 (2004); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.950–.980 (2002)
(repealed 2004).
39. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.300 (2004); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.950–.980 (2002)
(repealed 2004).
40. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.300, pt. 4 (2004). The optional form directive reads
as follows: “If you are satisfied to allow your agent to determine what is best for
you in making these mental health decisions, you do not need to fill out this part
of the form.” Id.
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health treatments.41 Under the repealed mental health declaration,
42
there was no such default. Rather, a patient who did not wish to
give an agent those powers did not have to fill out the form in the
43
first place.
Moreover, the witnessing requirements were more stringent
under the prior statute. Under that statute, neither witness could
44
be related to the patient, and the agent was expected to accept the
45
appointment in writing. Under the AHCDA, one witness may be
46
a relative of the patient’s. As a result, it is easier to delegate
important mental health decisions, and such delegation can even be
done accidentally by leaving Part Four of the statutory form blank.
This puzzling default in the mental health section underscores
a problem that surfaces throughout the AHCDA: people are
encouraged to fill out these forms as part of estate planning or
general good stewardship, even if they do not have current medical
problems; however, many parts of the statutory form seem
designed for those with an existing major medical issue.
III. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
The AHCDA’s history is unusual in that it took a full four
years of work in various committees in order for the bill to become
law. The bill was introduced in 2001, in the first session of the 22nd
47
legislature, as House Bill 197. After the House Health, Education
and Social Services (“HESS”) Committee and the Judiciary
Committee made amendments, the bill passed the House during
48
the second session of that legislature in 2002. It did not pass the
Senate (it was never even scheduled for a Senate hearing), and so,
technically speaking, it died. However, in the following legislature,

41. Although some individuals with current psychological disorders may wish
to give a trusted agent the authority to make these decisions on his or her behalf, it
is unlikely that a person who has no current mental disorder would want to
appoint someone to override his or her express wishes in this regard. After all,
mental health treatment is generally recommended only for conscious patients. If
the patient is conscious and agrees to the treatment, there is no need for the agent
to be involved. So, presumably if the agent is acting, it is because the patient is not
in agreement, at the time the decision must be made, with the proposed treatment.
42. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.950–.980 (2002) (repealed 2004).
43. Id.
44. § 47.30.954 (repealed 2004).
45. § 47.30.970 (repealed 2004).
46. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.010(e) (2004).
47. H.B. 197, 22d Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2001).
48. H.B. 197, 22d Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2002).
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the bill was reintroduced in exactly the same form.49 Finally, in
2004, after being amended numerous times by both the House and
Senate committees, the bill received near-unanimous legislative
50
approval and became law.
From the beginning, the bill was touted as being based on the
51
“Five Wishes.” The Five Wishes is a document developed by the
52
Aging With Dignity organization, which prompts the declarant to
make choices regarding the following:
1. Comfort care (such as how much medicine should be
provided, whether warm baths should be given, and
whether religious readings or “well-loved poems” should
be read aloud to the declarant when near death);
2. How people should treat the declarant (such as whether
people should be around when death is near, whether
members of a church or synagogue should be asked to pray
for the declarant, and whether there is a preference to die
in the home);
3. What loved ones should be told (including, for example,
whether the declarant wishes forgiveness from family or
friends, how the declarant wishes to be remembered, and
instructions for memorial services);
4. Desired medical treatment (including especially the
question of withdrawal of life support); and,
5. Which person should be named to make healthcare
decisions if the declarant is no longer able to do so.

49. Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 1st Sess. 6
(Alaska Feb. 13, 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/
M/HHES2003-02-131507. pdf.
50. H.B. 25, 23d Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2004).
51. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 6
(Alaska Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/
M/SHES2004-03-081333.pdf; Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d
Leg., 1st Sess. 11–13 (Alaska Feb. 13, 2003), available at http://www.
legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/HHES2003-02-131507.pdf; Minutes, H. Judiciary
Comm., 22d Leg., 2d Sess. 36–39 (Alaska Mar. 20, 2002), available at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/HJUD2002-03-201315.pdf; Minutes, H.
Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm. 22d Leg., 1st Sess. 8–13 (Alaska Apr. 17,
2001), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/HHES2001-04-171502.
pdf.
52. The
Dying
Process:
Five
Wishes
Document,
http://www.
learningplaceonline.com/stages/together/wishes/wishes-1.htm (last visited Sept. 26,
2005) [hereinafter Five Wishes Document].
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The 2001 version of the bill closely resembled the Five Wishes
document, including the many details of comfort care.53 However,
54
by 2002, legislative committees had substantially rewritten the bill;
eventually, the finished product was merely “inspired by” the Five
55
Wishes.
The Five Wishes document is a personal document not a legal
document, and, as such, is written in lay language. By contrast, the
AHCDA is more comforting to lawyers, as it is drafted in the style
of a legal document and employs language and stylistic trends
56
familiar to lawyers.
The legislature’s desire to provide something similar to the
Five Wishes explains those portions of the AHCDA related to the
healthcare directive, but those portions account for less than half of
the total Act. The rest of the bill was explained as an attempt to
bring together, under a single chapter, a variety of laws which
57
previously had been scattered throughout the statutes. The bill
58
can be said to have accomplished this.
53. Compare H.B. 197, 22d Leg. 13, 1st Sess. (Alaska 2001) with Five Wishes
Document, supra note 52, Part B, Wish 3.
54. Compare H.B. 197, 22d Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2001) with H.B. 197, 22d
Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 2002).
55. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 1st Sess. 6
(Alaska May 16, 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/
SHES2003-05-161351. pdf.
56. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.300, pt. 2(6)(B)(i)–(ii) (2004) (defining “a
condition of permanent unconsciousness” as “a condition that, to a high degree of
medical certainty, will last permanently without improvement; in which, to a high
degree of medical certainty, thought, sensation, purposeful action, social
interaction, and awareness of myself and the environment are absent; and for
which, to a high degree of medical certainty, initiating or continuing life sustaining
procedures for me, in light of my medical outcome, will provide only minimal
medical benefit for me”) with Five Wishes Document, supra note 52 (using terms
such as being “close to death,” “in a coma and not expected to wake up or
recover,” or “have permanent and severe brain damage and are not expected to
recover”).
57. Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 1st Sess. 8
(Alaska Feb. 13, 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/
23/M/HHES2003-02-131507.pdf; Minutes, H. Judiciary. Comm., 22d Leg., 2d Sess.
9–10 (Alaska Apr. 10, 2002), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/H
JUD2002-04-101318.pdf; Minutes, H. Judiciary Comm., 22d Leg., 2d Sess. 37
(Alaska Mar. 20, 2002), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/
HJUD2002-03-201315.pdf.
58. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010–.100 (2002) (repealed 2004) (living
wills and “Do Not Resuscitate” protocols), 13.50.010–.070 (repealed 2004) (organ
donation), 47.30.950–.980 (mental health powers of attorney). Current versions at
ALASKA STAT. § 13.52 (2004).
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For the most part, philosophical discussions about end-of-life
issues did not occur in the legislature until 2004, when the bill
reached the Senate HESS Committee. The chairman, Senator Fred
Dyson (R-Eagle River), raised a number of questions about life
59
support termination, as did the Alaska Catholic Conference. In
addition to numerous committee meetings, a meeting was held off
record and included the Alaska Catholic Conference’s
representative, the Lieutenant Governor’s chief of staff, and a staff
60
member of a legislator who advocated passage of the bill. As a
result of this meeting, a number of changes were made to the bill,
including the addition of a broad statement that, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary of the patient’s intent, the AHCDA
61
established a presumption in favor of life, and a clarification that
the AHCDA does not authorize mercy killing, assisted suicide, or
62
The changes did not entirely satisfy the Catholic
euthanasia.
63
Conference but seemed to assuage the concerns of Senator
Dyson, for when the bill moved to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
64
Senator Dyson advocated its passage.
One of the more interesting exchanges in the Senate HESS
Committee centered on the issue of pregnancy. Senator Dyson,
who described himself as “irrevocably pro-life regarding the
abortion issue” took the position that if a pregnant woman was in
an unconscious state, efforts should be made to keep the child
alive, even if that meant continuing life support past a point of
65
Senator Gretchen Guess
physical benefit for the woman.
(D-Anchorage) took the position that the statute should not
overturn a healthcare directive and that the healthcare directive
ought to have an option for a pregnant woman to determine
whether she would want to be kept alive so that the child might be

59. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 6, 18
(Alaska Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/
SHES2004-03-081333.pdf.
60. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 24
(Alaska Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/
SHES2004-03-241344.pdf.
61. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.120(a) (2004).
62. § 13.52.120(d).
63. Minutes, S. Judiciary Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 16 (Alaska Apr. 29, 2004),
available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/SJUD2004-04-290808.pdf.
64. Id.
65. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 11–12
(Alaska Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/
SHES2004-03-081333.pdf.
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born.66 This seems to have led to an odd compromise under which
the statute and the sample form say two different things. In the
67
sample form the declarant is to answer the question “should I
become unconscious and I am pregnant, I direct that” (followed by
several blank lines). However, a section of the AHCDA says that,
if a pregnant woman lacks capacity, a directive or decision to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining procedures may not be given
effect if it is probable that the fetus could develop to the point of
68
live birth with the provision of such life-sustaining procedures. In
other words, if life support will enable the baby to be born alive,
then life support must be continued, regardless of what the mother
might have said in her directive. So the AHCDA itself would
overrule a directive to discontinue life support. The resolution of
any tension between a directive and the AHCDA may hinge on
whether the doctor has actually read the statute or only the
approved statutory form.
After four years of testimony, committee hearings, committee
substitutes, and debate, the final version of House Bill 25 passed
the Senate unanimously, and was then adopted by the House with
69
only one dissenting House vote. The governor signed the Act the
70
following month, and it took effect on January 1, 2005.
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS
A central premise of this article posits that people approach
end-of-life issues from three different philosophical positions. This
section of the Article will analyze how each of these positions
ultimately influenced the adoption of the AHCDA.
A.

Self-Determination
The first of these positions is an emphasis on selfdetermination, that is, the ability to make one’s own decisions
about one’s own life. This is usually referenced as a “constitutional
right” to self-determination. In Cruzan v. Missouri Department of
71
Health, a case involving a woman in a vegetative state whose

66. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 12, 29
(Alaska Apr. 14, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/
SHES2004-04-141341.pdf (testimony of Sen. Gretchen Guess).
67. ALASKA STAT. 13.52.300, pt. 2(6)(E) (2004).
68. § 13.52.055(b).
69. H.J. 23, 2d Sess., at 4026 (Alaska 2004); S.J. 23, 2d Sess., at 3248 (Alaska
2004).
70. H.J. 23, 2d Sess., at 4508 (Alaska 2004).
71. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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family wanted to remove her feeding tube, the United States
Supreme Court held that the early common law rule that
individuals are to be free from the restraint or interference of
72
others and the requirement for informed consent to medical
73
suggested that a competent person has a
treatment
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
74
medical treatment. The Court noted in Cruzan that this right to
self-determination may also extend to allowing others to exercise
75
what it called a substituted judgment. Substituted judgment
involves informing the medical providers of what the patient,
presumably unable to express his or her own wishes, would have
wanted regarding cessation of medical treatment. Interestingly,
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion does not actually find
that there is a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, but
rather notes that such a right could be inferred from the Court’s
76
In the subsequent case of Washington v.
previous decisions.
77
Glucksberg, the Court, again in an opinion written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, noted that while that right could be inferred
(since it had been “strongly suggested” by previous opinions), it
78
had not actually been pronounced by the Court.
B. Sanctity of Life
The second significant philosophical position represents an
emphasis on the sanctity of life. The Supreme Court has
recognized this position, not as a constitutional right, but as a
79
legitimate state interest, which a state can consider in establishing
laws. In Cruzan, it was this interest, among others, that justified
allowing Missouri to require clear and convincing evidence that the
80
individual would want life support terminated. In Glucksberg, the
state’s interest in the preservation of life was a factor in upholding
81
the state of Washington’s prohibition of assisted suicide.

72. Id. at 267 (citing Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891)).
73. Id. at 269 (citing Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914)).
74. Id. at 278.
75. Id. at 284.
76. See id. at 278–79.
77. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
78. See id. at 720.
79. Id. at 728–29; Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280.
80. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281.
81. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728–29.
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C. Quality of Life
A patient’s quality of life has never been specifically
recognized as either a legitimate interest or a right by the Supreme
Court. Nonetheless, concern for a patient’s quality of life
influenced the debate over the AHCDA.
A moderate quality of life position may be defined as concern
for the pain and misery that accompany the end of life. An
extreme position suggests that once one is no longer able to do
anything useful, productive, or interesting, one ought to die.
Various courts and professional groups have taken diverging
positions on this philosophical question.
82
In In re Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court factored
into its decision-making calculus the likelihood of the patient ever
returning to “cognitive life,” thus taking a position somewhere
83
between the moderate and the extreme positions outlined above.
In one survey of doctors and medical administrators, a
remarkable 89% believed it was ethical to withdraw nutrition and
hydration from patients in a vegetative state, with a majority
endorsing the view that patients in a vegetative state would be
84
“better off dead.” One version of this philosophy was expressed
in the legislative hearings on the AHCDA by Dr. Maria
85
Wallington, a medical ethicist. She testified that the decision to
terminate life support should hinge on whether “what is needed to
keep the person alive actually allows him/her to go on with life” or
the chance the person will become healthy again and not depend
86
on medical care.
Remarkably, throughout the lengthy history of committee
hearings and floor debates in 2001, 2002, and 2003, there was
hardly any examination of the philosophical underpinnings of the
law, which initially appeared to be strongly influenced by the right
to self-determination.
Throughout the committee minutes,
legislators appeared to assume that people should be able to make
87
their own choices regarding end-of-life decisions. Examples, both
82. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
83. Id. at 664.
84. Kirk Payne et al., Physicians’ Attitudes about the Care of Patients in the
Persistent Vegetative State: A National Survey, 125 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.
104, 105 (1996).
85. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 12-14
(Alaska Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/SHES
2004-04-071745.pdf.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 1st
Sess. 17 (Alaska Feb. 27, 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/
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good and bad, were given from the personal experiences of
witnesses and legislators.88 However, no one raised much concern
for the sanctity of life, until the bill reached the Senate HESS
89
Committee in March 2004. At that point, intertwined with the
debate over the pregnancy provisions of the bill and the
hammering out of various details, the concern for the sanctity of
90
Senator Dyson and the Alaska Catholic
life finally surfaced.
Conference raised the issue, and a few witnesses took opposing
91
positions.
Notably, a significant portion of the debate centered on the
92
issue of withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. Senator
Dyson raised this as a main question about the bill in the opening

M/HHES2003-02-271504.pdf; Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm.,
23d Leg., 1st Sess. 4 (Alaska Feb. 13, 2003), available at http://www.legis.
state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/HHES2003-02-131507.pdf; Minutes, H. Judiciary Comm.,
22d Leg., 2d Sess. 12 (Alaska Apr. 10, 2002), available at http://www.legis.
state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/HJUD2002-04-101318.pdf; Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and
Soc. Serv. Comm., 22d Leg., 1st Sess. 27 (Alaska Apr. 24, 2001), available at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/HHES2001-04-241508.pdf; Minutes, H.
Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 22d Leg., 1st Sess. 8 (Alaska Apr. 17, 2001),
available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/HHES2001-04-171502.pdf.
88. See, e.g., Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 1st
Sess. 6 (Alaska May 16, 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/
M/SHES2003-05-161351.pdf; Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d
Leg.,
1st
Sess.
20–21
(Alaska
Feb.
27,
2003),
available
at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/HHES2003-02-271504.pdf; Minutes, H.
Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 1st Sess. 3-4 (Alaska Feb. 13, 2003),
available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/HHES2003-02-131507.pdf;
Minutes, H. Judiciary Comm., 22d Leg., 2d Sess. 11 (Alaska Apr. 10, 2002),
available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/22/M/HJUD2002-04-101318.pdf;
Minutes, H. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 22d Leg., 1st Sess. 11 (Alaska
Apr. 17, 2001), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/ 22/M/HHES2001-04171502.pdf.
89. See Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 1819 (Alaska Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/
M/SHES2004-03-081333.pdf.
90. See id.
91. Including, curiously, Dr. Maria Wallington, who purported to represent
Providence Health Systems, which is owned by Sisters of Providence, a branch of
the Roman Catholic Church. With the Alaska Catholic Conference (representing
the Catholic bishops in Alaska) on one side of several issues, and Dr. Wallington
of Providence Health Systems on the other, two different agencies of the Roman
Catholic Church (sometimes thought to be “monolithic”) weighed in on opposite
sides of the debate. See id. at 8.
92. Id. at 14–19.
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of his committee’s hearing.93 A representative of the Alaska
Nurses’ Association argued that withholding fluid and nutrition
94
actually allows a patient to die naturally. Dr. Wallington argued
that the law should safeguard the choices made in a person’s
95
On the other hand, the Alaska Catholic
advance directive.
Conference representative argued that the law should have a strong
presumption in favor of life, quoting the statement of then-Pope
John Paul II that administration of water and food always
represents a natural means of preserving life, not a medical act,
96
even when provided by artificial means.
Ultimately, for the most part, the resulting bill is based on the
right to self-determination, with a few specific overlays based on
concern for the sanctity of life. Life support, including artificial
nutrition and hydration, can be withdrawn only if the person is in a
state of permanent unconsciousness (meaning a coma or a
permanent vegetative state, depending on how one interprets the
97
A surrogate, whether
definitions) or has a terminal illness.
appointed by the patient or selected according to the statutory
procedure, can make decisions for the patient; but in doing so, the
surrogate must consider the patient’s personal values, including any
98
Life support may not be withdrawn for a
religious beliefs.
pregnant woman if her child could survive to birth with the
99
procedures in place. Further, a healthcare provider may decline
to provide “medically ineffective health care or healthcare contrary
to generally accepted health care standards,” but only after
providing the family an opportunity to transfer the patient to
100
another institution. Finally, the AHCDA explicitly states that, in
the absence of evidence of the patient’s intent to the contrary, the
law establishes a presumption in favor of life, consistent with the
101
patient’s best interest.

93. Id. at 7.
94. Id. at 9.
95. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 12
(Alaska Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/
M/SHES2004-04-071745.pdf.
96. Id. at 20.
97. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.52.045, .390 (2004).
98. §§ 13.52.030(g), .390(6)(G).
99. § 13.52.055.
100. § 13.52.060(f)–(g).
101. § 13.52.120.
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D. Distrust of Lawyers
A distrust for lawyers seems, if only speculatively, to have
influenced the bill. Such distrust is evidenced by the fact that the
AHCDA vests final decision-making authority in patients, their
agents, or their surrogates, with some limited rights-of-refusal or
102
Further, doctors, not courts, decide
review by their doctors.
103
whether a person lacks capacity. A doctor may decline to comply
with a surrogate’s decisions if he or she believes that the surrogate
is not abiding by the wishes, values, and best interest of the
104
The doctor can otherwise refuse to comply with the
patient.
individual instruction or decision for a variety of reasons, such as
105
“reasons of conscience,” or a belief that the proposed treatment
would be ineffective or contrary to generally accepted healthcare
106
It is the doctor who ultimately decides whether to
standards.
107
The AHCDA grants
issue a “Do Not Resuscitate” order.
healthcare providers fairly broad immunity in making these
108
The role of the judiciary receives only the briefest
decisions.
109
mention, and an agent’s healthcare decision can even overrule the
decision of a court-appointed guardian (unless a court order
110
specifically provides otherwise).
111
In his book Strangers at the Bedside, historian David
Rothman chronicles how, beginning in the 1960s, the United States
evolved from a society of unwavering acceptance of the decisions
of doctors to a society in which lawyers, bioethicists, politicians,
judges, and ethics committees are involved in the decision-making.
He credits the shift in part to the fact that most Americans no
longer have a trusted family doctor whom they know well enough
112
Nonetheless, the AHCDA
to trust with end-of-life decisions.
places some of the decision-making authority directly into the
113
physician’s hands. Thus, the AHCDA assumes that patients want
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See §§ 13.52.010-.395.
§ 13.52.010(g).
§ 13.52.030(h).
§ 13.52.060(e).
§ 13.52.060 (f).
§ 13.52.065.
§ 13.52.080.
§ 13.52.140.
§ 13.52.040(b).
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW
LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (Walter de
Gruyter 2003) (1991).
112. See id. at 128–31.
113. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.300, pt. 5 (2004); see also § 13.52.030(h).
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their primary physicians to make such decisions. This is a
questionable assumption in an age when many people go to a clinic,
family practice group, or emergency room for primary care. At no
point did legislators discuss this issue in the many committee
hearings on the bill. Therefore, whether the AHCDA reflects an
atavistic view of primary physicians or merely a general hesitancy
114
to let lawyers make these decisions is uncertain.
An emphasis on decision making by physicians may have also
resulted from the drafters’ focus on patients with pre-existing
medical conditions, rather than on those who fill out the advance
115
For instance,
directive form as part of general estate planning.
the designation of a primary physician will typically pose little
problem for someone with cancer, who would likely designate his
or her oncologist. Regardless, under the AHCDA, nearly all endof-life decisions will be made by doctors in consultation with family
members, and very few decisions will be made by judges.
V. APPLICATION TO CASES
One rarely appreciates the implications of a statute until one
applies the statute to a set of facts. This part of the Article will
examine some of the best-known cases from recent memory to
determine how they might have turned out under the AHCDA.
A. Karen Ann Quinlan
In April of 1975, Karen Ann Quinlan, a twenty-one year old
116
She was revived, but
New Jersey woman, stopped breathing.
suffered anoxia, or a loss of oxygen in the blood stream going to
117
the brain. Quinlan ended up in a “chronic persistent vegetative
state,” which was explained as a “primitive reflex level” of
neurological function, with the brain stem working, but other parts
118
of the brain nonfunctional. She was sustained by a respirator and
feeding tube, and it was assumed by the doctors (incorrectly, as it
114. The Alaska Legislature has invariably had fewer attorney members than
most legislatures. In the current 24th Alaska Legislature, only eleven of sixty
legislators hold law degrees, according to their legislative web sites. See Alaska
Leg. State Senate, http://w3.legis.state.ak.us/senate/24/senate.htm (last visited Oct.
19, 2005); Alaska Leg. H. R., http://w3.legis.state.ak.us/house/24/house.htm (last
visited Oct. 19, 2005).
115. See, e.g., Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d
Sess. 11–22 (Alaska Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/
M/SHES2004-04-071745.pdf.
116. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 653–54 (N.J. 1976).
117. Id. at 654.
118. Id. at 654–55.
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turned out) that her primitive level of brain stem function would be
insufficient for her to breathe on her own.119
Karen’s father filed a petition, asking that he be appointed
guardian and that the letters of guardianship contain an express
power to authorize the discontinuance of all extraordinary medical
120
The hospital opposed the discontinuance, and the
procedures.
121
judge denied the father’s request. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey found that if Karen were able to do so, she could
122
decide to discontinue the life support apparatus. Addressing the
question of substitution of judgment, the court determined that her
123
guardian could “assert her right to privacy” on her behalf. The
court did not assert a broad right of guardians to make such
decisions, but rather found such a right to be reasonable within the
124
context of these particular facts. In doing so, the court balanced
the individual’s right to privacy against the State’s interest in the
preservation and sanctity of human life and a physician’s right to
125
administer medical treatment according to his best judgment.
The court applied a sliding scale, finding that the State’s interest
weakened, and the individual’s right to privacy grew, “as the
degree of bodily invasion increase[d] and the prognosis
126
The court incorporated consideration of Karen’s
dim[med].”
127
It said that the “focal point of
quality of life into the analysis.
decision should be the prognosis as to the reasonable possibility of
return to cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished from the forced
continuance of that biological vegetative existence to which Karen
128
seems to be doomed.” As the court’s words indicate, the quality
of life philosophical position is implicated whenever the focus is on
the possibility of returning to a sapient or more productive level of
129
life.

119. See id. at 655.
120. Id. at 651.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 663.
123. Id. at 664.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 663–64. The doctors in this case were opposed to the removal of life
support. Id. at 663.
126. Id. at 664.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 669.
129. Conversely, the sanctity of life position would tend to consider any life as
being valuable, even if it were sub-cognitive. The self-determination position
would be neutral unless the patient had expressed her wishes in some way.
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The court announced a rather curious requirement for
termination of life support: although the father was appointed
guardian, in order to terminate life support he had to obtain the
130
concurrence of the rest of the family. Furthermore, the attending
physicians, in consultation with the hospital ethics committee, had
to determine that there was no reasonable possibility of Karen ever
131
emerging from her vegetative state.
How would the Quinlan case be analyzed under the AHCDA?
132
Because Karen did not have an advance healthcare directive, her
133
father would have turned to the surrogacy statute, and because
she had no spouse or adult child, her father would be next in line to
134
be Karen’s surrogate under the AHCDA. Therefore, he would
have the authority to act, assuming Karen’s mother did not
135
object.
As surrogate, Mr. Quinlan would inform the attending
physician that he wanted life support removed. The doctor would
turn to section 13.52.045 and see that, because Karen did not sign a
directive to the contrary, he would not be prohibited from
136
removing the life support.
Next, the same section would direct him over to section
137
13.52.160 to see whether Karen had a “qualifying condition.”
That section does not actually define “qualifying condition,” but
rather requires that the determination be made by the patient’s
138
primary physician and at least one other physician. A “qualifying
condition” is defined in section 13.52.390(36) as either a terminal
139
condition or permanent unconsciousness.
The definition of “terminal condition” is “an incurable or
irreversible illness or injury” that will result in imminent death, for
which there is no reasonable prospect of cure or recovery, that
imposes severe pain or an inhumane burden on the patient, and for
which continuing life sustaining procedures will provide only

130. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 671–72.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 664.
133. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.030 (2004).
134. § 13.52.030(c).
135. Karen’s mother would have the same right as Karen’s father to declare
herself a surrogate. See id.
136. § 13.52.045.
137. Id.
138. § 13.52.160. In the case of permanent unconsciousness, the doctors must
also consult with a neurologist. Id.
139. § 13.52.390(36).
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minimal medical benefit.140 The definition of “terminal condition”
would be problematic here, because there was no guarantee that
Karen would die within a “short period of time” if life-sustaining
141
Additionally, Karen’s family
procedures were discontinued.
members did not request removal of the feeding tube, further
casting doubt on whether removal of the respirator would result in
142
death.
The doctor would next turn to the definition of “permanent
unconsciousness”: a condition that will last “permanently without
improvement,” in which thought, sensation, purposeful action,
social interaction, and awareness of self and the environment are
absent, and for which initiating or continuing life sustaining
143
procedures provide only minimal medical benefit. This definition
is also problematic for a person in a vegetative state because it
144
Doctors seem to be in some
requires that sensation be absent.
disagreement as to whether a patient in a persistent vegetative state
145
If Karen felt pain, one would assume sensation was
feels pain.
not absent, and the definition of permanent unconsciousness could
146
There is no general consensus in
not legitimately be met.
neurology on this issue, probably due to the fact that although
147
patients in a vegetative state react to painful stimuli, they lack a
connection to the “higher” parts of the brain that understand what
148
According to one survey of doctors, about 30% of the
pain is.
respondents believe that vegetative state patients experience pain,
140. § 13.52.390(42).
141. In fact, to everyone’s surprise, after the respirator was eventually removed,
Karen Quinlan lived for another ten years. Ascension Health, Healthcare Ethics
Cases: Quinlan, Karen Ann, http://www.ascensionhealth.org/ethics/public/
cases/case21.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
142. The Quinlan family was strict Roman Catholic and made the decision to
remove her from the respirator only after consultation with, and approval by, the
church, which would not have approved removal of the feeding tube. In re
Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 657–60 (N.J. 1976).
143. § 13.52.390(31).
144. Id.
145. Payne et al., supra note 84, at 105 tbl. 2.
146. For instance, the Cruzan decisions made several references to her
responses to painful stimuli. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
266–67 n.1 (1990) (quoting Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1989)).
147. Jan Kassubek et al., Activation of a Residual Cortical Network During
Painful Stimulation in Long-term Postanoxic Vegetative State, 212 J.
NEUROLOGICAL SCI. 85, 88 (2003).
148. See generally S. Laureys et al., Cortical Processing of Noxious
Somatosensory Stimuli in the Persistent Vegetative State, 17 NEUROIMAGE 732
(2002).
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and about 13% believe they experience hunger and thirst.149 Given
that the majority of doctors believe there is no sensation, combined
150
with the possibility of “doctor shopping” by the family, it is
probably safe to assume that the Quinlans could, today, find a
doctor who agrees that Karen meets the criteria for “permanent
unconsciousness.” This is even further evident when considering
that 88% of the doctors responding to the survey believed it was
ethical to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from a patient
151
in a vegetative state.
The legislative history also yields some guidance. The
definition of “permanent unconsciousness” was based on an Illinois
152
153
statute, which includes the mandate that sensation be absent.
While the Illinois courts have not specifically addressed the
question of whether reaction to painful stimuli constitutes
sensation, several Illinois Supreme Court decisions have concluded
that the condition of permanent unconsciousness covers the patient
154
in a vegetative state. Also, during legislative hearings in 2004, the
Alaska legislative aide who had been shepherding the bill through
the legislature specifically referenced “vegetative state” among the
circumstances that would constitute a qualifying condition for
155
purposes of removal of life support.
Let us assume that the primary physician and one other
156
doctor, after consulting with the neurologist, have informed the
attending physician that at least one of the qualifying conditions
has been met, either because they assume Karen will die within a
short period of time without life support or because they believe
she does not have sensation. The matter would then be back in the
hands of the attending physician, who would return to section

149. See Payne et al., supra note 84, at 105.
150. Nothing in the AHCDA, or other Alaska laws, prohibit the surrogate from
looking for another doctor who agrees with him or her. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.52
(2004).
151. Payne et al., supra note 84, at 107.
152. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 25
(Alaska Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/
SHES2004-03-241344.pdf (testimony of Linda Sylvester).
153. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/10 (2005).
154. See, e.g., In re Estate of Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ill. 1990); In re
Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 298 (Ill. 1989).
155. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 24
(Alaska Apr. 14, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/
SHES2004-04-141341.pdf (testimony of Linda Sylvester).
156. The neurologist does not have to agree with the primary physician; he or
she only needs to be consulted. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.160 (2004).
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13.52.045 and see that there must be an additional determination
that withdrawing the life support would be consistent with the
157
patient’s best interest. However, this decision is initially made by
158
the surrogate. The doctor would thus direct Mr. Quinlan to make
the determination and, to the extent known to him, to consider
159
Karen’s wishes and personal values. He would explain that “best
interest” means that the benefits to the individual outweigh the
burdens on the individual. In this decision, several factors should
be considered: “the effect of treatment on the physical, emotional,
and cognitive functions of the patient”; “the degree of pain or
discomfort caused by either treatment or withdrawal of treatment”;
the degree to which Karen’s medical condition results in a severe
and continuing impairment; the effect of treatment on her life
expectancy; the prognosis for recovery; the risks, side effects, and
benefits of treating or not treating; and Karen’s religious beliefs
160
Presumably, Mr. Quinlan would report back
and basic values.
that he has considered all of those factors and still believes it to be
in Karen’s best interest to withdraw life support.
The decision would now go back to the medical professionals
for several possible vetoes. First, the patient’s primary healthcare
provider may determine that the surrogate is not abiding by the
wishes, values, and best interest of the patient, and may therefore
161
Alternatively,
decline to comply with the surrogate’s decision.
the healthcare provider may decline to comply for reasons of
162
It is hard to say whether Karen’s physicians would
conscience.
veto the surrogate’s decision; they testified that “removal from the
respirator would not conform to medical practices, standards and
163
traditions,” but that standard is not recognizably close to the
164
standard under the AHCDA. Under the AHCDA, a healthcare
provider can refuse to provide healthcare contrary to generally
165
But here it would not be a
accepted healthcare standards.
question of providing healthcare, but rather of withdrawing it. As
best as can be determined from the case law, the doctors never
166
However, they might have
asserted an objection of conscience.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

§ 13.52.045.
Id.
§ 13.52.030(g).
§ 13.52.390(6).
§ 13.52.030(h).
§ 13.52.060(e).
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 655 (N.J. 1976).
See § 13.52.060(f).
Id.
See Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647–72.
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argued that removal was not in Karen’s best interest, especially in
1976.
If either side chose to go to court, they could do so under
section 13.52.140, which provides that a court, through a
guardianship proceeding, may enjoin or direct a healthcare
167
decision. A probate court judge adjudicating Karen’s case would
need to know what legal standard to apply, and immediately he or
she would encounter a problem: there is an apparent error in the
section on judicial relief. Section 13.52.140 says that a proceeding
to enjoin or direct a healthcare decision is governed by sections
168
However, these statutory sections do not cover
13.26.165–.320.
169
In Alaska,
adult guardianships, but rather conservatorships.
conservators deal only with financial matters, not with medical
170
decisions, and the procedural protections are less than those for
171
appointment of a guardian. The statute should have referenced
sections 13.26.090–.155, for guardians of incapacitated adults.
There is, within those sections, a specific provision as to what a
guardian is or is not allowed to do:
A guardian may not . . . consent on behalf of the ward to the
withholding of lifesaving medical procedures; however, a
guardian is not required to oppose the cessation or withholding
of lifesaving medical procedures when those procedures will
serve only to prolong the dying process and offer no reasonable
expectation of effecting a temporary or permanent cure of or
relief from the illness or condition being treated unless the ward
has clearly stated
that lifesaving medical procedures not be
172
withheld . . . .

Is the probate court to look only to this section of the
guardianship statutes and determine whether a guardian is fulfilling
that duty, or is the probate court to look at the AHCDA and
review all of its decision-making requirements (including whether
the patient has a qualifying condition, and whether it is in the
patient’s best interest to withdraw life support)? That question will
undoubtedly have to be answered in future litigation.
At any rate, the likely end result is that Karen Quinlan would
still have her respirator removed, as she would be found to have
met the standards of both the guardianship and healthcare decision
laws related to removal of life support. In fact, Karen continued to

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

§ 13.52.140.
Id.
§§ 13.26.165-.320.
§ 13.26.280.
See §§ 13.26.165-.320.
§ 13.26.150(e)(3).
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breathe after removal of the respirator173 and could survive for as
174
long as she had the feeding tube inserted. Under the AHCDA,
she could have the tube removed only upon her father’s consent or
if the doctors concluded that it was “medically ineffective health
175
care,” a problematic standard that will be examined in more
detail in the Sun Hudson case below.
B. Nancy Beth Cruzan
In January 1983, a Missouri woman, Nancy Cruzan, was in a
176
serious automobile accident. Paramedics were able to restore her
177
After three weeks in a coma, she
breathing and heart beat.
178
progressed to a vegetative state. She was able to take some food
orally, but in order to ease the feeding and ensure that she had
sufficient nutrition, a “gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube”
179
However, after several years with no
was surgically inserted.
improvement, Nancy’s parents, who had already been appointed as
co-guardians, petitioned in Missouri state court for authority to
180
remove the feeding tube.
Initially, the only evidence as to Nancy’s own wishes was
testimony by a former roommate that Nancy once said that she
would not wish to continue her life unless she could live at least
181
The trial court authorized the withdrawal of
halfway normally.
182
life support, but the state appealed. The Missouri Supreme Court
reversed, based on Missouri’s living will statute, which had a policy
183
Specifically, Missouri
strongly favoring preservation of life.
required clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s wishes for
removal of life support when there was not a specific advance
184
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Missouri
directive.
had a legitimate interest in the protection and preservation of

173. Ascension Health, Healthcare Ethics Cases: Quinlan, Karen Ann,
http://www.ascensionhealth.org/ethics/public/cases/case21.asp (last visited Sept. 21,
2005).
174. Id.
175. § 13.52.060 (f).
176. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 267–68.
181. Id. at 268.
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 265.
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human life, which it was entitled to safeguard with a statute
designed to guard against potential abuses.185
There, the case law ends, but not the case. The publicity
surrounding Cruzan brought forward two new witnesses who had
known Nancy before her accident and who learned about the case
186
They both
through the news coverage surrounding the appeal.
related conversations with Nancy, which supported the idea that
187
she would not want to live in a vegetative state. Aided by
friendlier medical testimony the second time around, Mr. and Mrs.
Cruzan prevailed in a new trial; third-party attempts to intervene
and appeal were refused, and the feeding tube was removed,
188
resulting in Nancy Cruzan’s death twelve days later.
In many respects, Nancy Cruzan’s situation was similar to that
of Karen Quinlan. However, a significant difference is that Nancy
189
However, she did need a
Cruzan did not need a respirator.
feeding tube, and unlike the Quinlans, the Cruzan family wanted
190
The AHCDA makes no distinction
the feeding tube removed.
between respirators and feeding tubes; they are all considered “life
sustaining procedures” that may be withheld if the qualifying
191
conditions are met. This distinction may make a big difference to
the Roman Catholic Church and, judging by the number of
192
protestors in both the Cruzan and Schiavo cases, to quite a lot of
other people as well. However, it makes no legal difference in
Alaska. It should be noted that defining artificial hydration and
nutrition as medical care constitutes a significant philosophical
choice on the legislature’s part; the Catholic Church, among others,

185. Id. at 282.
186. WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE: THE DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN
333–36 (2002).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 341–89.
189. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988). Another potentially
significant difference is that Cruzan was married at the time of her accident.
However, Cruzan’s husband agreed to dissolution of their marriage before the
case reached the point of contested litigation. COLBY, supra note 187, at 29.
Hence, Cruzan’s marriage does not affect the outcome of the analysis.
190. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d. at 410–11.
191. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.390(26) (2004).
192. COLBY, supra note 18, at 371–77; All Things Considered: Protesters at
Schiavo Hospice Grow Agitated (NPR broadcast Mar. 27, 2005); Larry Copeland
and Laura Parker, Terri Schiavo’s Case Doesn’t End With Her Passing, USA
Today, Apr. 1, 2005, at A1.
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would define it not as medical care but as feeding, and thus a basic
responsibility which must not be withdrawn.193
The next difference looks like a complication, but it actually
leads to a simplification: Nancy Cruzan’s parents were already her
guardians when they decided to withhold artificial nutrition and
194
hydration. As her guardians, they would be surprised to discover
that the AHCDA does not grant them any authority: it only allows
an agent or surrogate to withhold or withdraw life sustaining
195
A guardian is not an agent or a surrogate. The
procedures.
definition of an agent requires that the declarant have executed a
196
durable power of attorney for healthcare. Furthermore, the
197
definition of surrogate specifically excludes guardians.
The operation of these definitions, as they apply to the
AHCDA, might be cause for consternation. However, not all of
the laws related to end-of-life decision-making were included in
Chapter 13.52. For example, under section 13.26.150(e)(3), which
is part of the guardianship statutes, a guardian can oppose cessation
of “life saving medical procedures” under a set of conditions
198
The guardian may consent to
similar to those in the AHCDA.
the withholding of such procedures when “[the procedures] will
only serve to prolong the dying process, and offer no reasonable
expectation of effecting a cure of or relief from the condition being
treated if the ward has not clearly stated that the life sustaining
199
While Nancy never
medical procedures not be withheld . . . .”
200
prohibited such procedures from being withheld, another portion
of that set of conditions is problematic. It refers to prolonging the
dying process. Prior to the removal of the feeding tube, Nancy was
not dying; the consensus was that she could possibly live for

193. Minutes, S. Health, Educ. and Soc. Serv. Comm., 23d Leg., 2d Sess. 20
(Alaska Apr. 7, 2004), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/23/M/
SHES2004-04-071745.pdf (testimony of Chip Wagoner, representing the Alaska
Catholic Conference).
194. See Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 410.
195. The AHCDA states “an agent or a surrogate may determine that lifesustaining procedures may be withheld or withdrawn . . . .” § 13.52.045.
196. § 13.52.390(2).
197. § 13.52.390(40).
198. § 13.26.150(e)(3).
199. Id.
200. Ms. Cruzan had only made general statements to a roommate that she
would not want to continue her life unless she could live “halfway normally.” See
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411, 424 (Mo. 1988).
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another thirty years.201 Unfortunately, this requirement in section
13.26.150(e)(3) seems to have been written for terminally ill
patients, not patients in a coma or a vegetative state. However,
202
technically speaking, the feeding tube prolongs the dying process.
Furthermore, the feeding tube appears to meet the other
requirements of section 13.26.150(e) because it would offer no
203
Under
reasonable expectation of a cure or relief for Cruzan.
these circumstances, the guardian would undoubtedly be legally
204
Nothing in the adult Guardianship
justified in taking action.
Statutes or the AHCDA requires a guardian to seek specific court
205
Under section
approval to withhold or withdraw life support.
13.52.140, the superior court may enjoin or direct a healthcare
206
decision, but an application to the superior court is not required.
A healthcare decision made by a guardian is effective without
207
judicial approval.
A question remains as to the conscience clause in section
13.52.060(e), which allows a healthcare provider to decline to
208
comply with an instruction for reasons of conscience. The staterun institution in which Nancy lived out her final years strongly
209
opposed, on moral grounds, the removal of the feeding tube.
However, the AHCDA’s conscience clause has different standards
for healthcare providers and healthcare institutions or facilities.
210
The provider may decline to comply for reasons of conscience,
but another provider can easily be brought in to remove the tube.
Under the statute, the healthcare facility can object to an
instruction only if it is contrary to a written policy of the facility
211
that is expressly based on reasons of conscience. Nothing in the
case law or background materials suggests that the Missouri
Rehabilitation Center had any such written policy. Therefore the
facility would not have had the right to object.

201. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 n.1 (1990) (citing
Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 411).
202. Nancy Valko, Of Living Wills and Butterfly Ballots, LIFEISSUES.NET,
http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/val/val_11_livingwills.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2005).
203. See § 13.26.150(e)(3).
204. See id.
205. §§ 13.26.090-.155; §§ 13.52.010-.395.
206. § 13.52.040(c).
207. Id.
208. § 13.52.060.
209. COLBY, supra note 18, at 188–96.
210. § 13.52.060(e).
211. Id.
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The AHCDA’s section on judicial relief allows the healthcare
provider to petition the superior court for an injunction.212 In
Cruzan, the facility may have sought this relief because the appeals
featured the State of Missouri, representing its healthcare
213
institution as a party, and the Cruzans as the opposing party.
After the appeals, the State of Missouri was dismissed from the
214
guardianship case. Even if the State of Missouri had continued to
be involved with the guardianship case, the guardianship statute
would have formed the substantive basis for the decision to
withdraw life support, and the conditions of that statute appear to
215
be easily met.
Analyzing Cruzan’s case under the AHCDA demonstrates
that when a patient is in a terminal, comatose, or vegetative state,
and has not executed an advance directive, a close family member
who wants to remove life support should not claim the status of
surrogate. Rather, the family member should petition to be
appointed guardian first and then act under the guardianship
statute. Because the guardianship statutes were not updated to be
consistent with the AHCDA, it is easier for a guardian to find
sufficient legal justification to terminate life support.
C. Teresa Marie Schindler-Schiavo
In February of 1990, Terri Schiavo suffered a heart attack at
216
The heart attack caused her to enter
the age of twenty-seven.
217
Her husband, Michael Schiavo, was
into a vegetative state.
218
appointed guardian without objection. By 1993, however, serious
219
disagreements between Terri’s parents and Michael ensued. The
220
parents petitioned to have Michael removed as guardian, and
Michael eventually petitioned the court to allow him to remove the
221
feeding tube that kept Terri alive. The trial court found clear and

212. § 13.52.140.
213. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Mo. 1988).
214. COLBY, supra note 18, at 330–31, 341.
215. § 13.26.150(e)(3).
216. Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So.2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
[hereinafter Schiavo I].
217. Id.
218. Id.; see also Jay Wolfson, Guardian ad Litem, A Report to Governor Jeb
Bush and the 6th Judicial Circuit in the Matter of Theresa Marie Schiavo 8 (Dec.
1, 2003), available at http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/wolfson%27s%20
report.pdf [hereinafter Wolfson Report].
219. Schiavo I, 780 So.2d at 178; see also Wolfson Report, supra note 218, at 8.
220. Schiavo I, 780 So.2d at 177–78.
221. Id. at 177.
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convincing evidence to support removal of the feeding tube.222
Despite interventions by Terri’s parents, the Florida governor and
legislature, and the United States Congress and President, the
courts sided with Michael Schiavo and allowed the feeding tube to
223
224
be removed. Terri Schiavo died on March 31, 2005.
The first court action in the Schiavo case was the uncontested
225
Under
petition by Michael Schiavo to be appointed guardian.
Alaska law, a spouse has priority for appointment as guardian,
unless the incapacitated person nominated someone else at a time
when she had sufficient mental capacity to make an informed
226
choice. A court may decline to appoint a person who has priority
227
when it is in the best interest of the incapacitated person.
In the Schiavo case, there was initially no reason for the court
to consider that it might not be in Terri’s best interest to appoint
228
her husband as her guardian. When Terri’s parents petitioned to
remove Michael as the guardian, an Alaska court would have
turned to section 13.26.125 and found that, while the court was
clearly empowered to remove and replace a guardian, the statutes
do not dictate the substantive standard for taking such action.
Subsection (e) of that section states that a guardian may be
removed if there is “probable cause to believe [he] is not
performing [his] responsibilities effectively and there is an
imminent danger that the physical health or safety of the ward will
229
be seriously impaired . . . .” However, it is clear from the context
230
The Alaska
of that subsection that there may be other bases.
222. Id. at 179.
223. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1226 (Fla. 11th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter
Schiavo II].
224. Abby Goodnough, Schiavo Dies, Ending Bitter Case over Feeding Tube,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com.
225. Schiavo I, 780 So. 2d at 177.
226. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.145(d)(1)-(2) (2004).
227. § 13.26.145(f).
228. Later issues arose largely for two reasons. First, Michael Schiavo took the
position that his wife should be allowed to die. Even before applying to the court
for an order to terminate life support, he had entered a DNR order for her. Diana
Lynne, The Whole Terri Schiavo Story, WORLD NET DAILY, Mar. 25, 2005,
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=43463; see also
Wolfson Report, supra note 218, at 10. Second, Michael began to live with a
woman he referred to as his fiancé and with whom he had two children. Jamie
Thompson, She’s the Other Woman in Michael Schiavo’s Heart, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2005/03/26/Tampabay/
She_s_the_other_woman.shtml.
229. § 13.26.125(e).
230. See id.
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Supreme Court addressed this question recently in H.C.S. v.
Community Advocacy Project of Alaska, Inc.231
The court
concluded that before removing or replacing a guardian, the trial
court should first determine whether there has been a material
change in circumstances since the guardian was originally
appointed, and if there has been, whether the existing appointment
232
Terri’s parents alleged abuse by
is in the ward’s best interest.
233
Michael, but the judge found inadequate evidence of abuse. In
all likelihood, the same judge who would later order removal of
Terri’s feeding tube would not have removed Michael from his
position as guardian for proposing a DNR order.
This leaves the question of whether a conflict existed due to
Michael’s romantic interest in another woman. Nothing in the
Alaska statutes or case law indicates whether such a conflict would
have been sufficient, in and of itself, to justify removal. The
priority section of the guardianship statutes states that the court
may not appoint a person who has “interests that may conflict with
234
However, this provision is
those of the incapacitated person.”
included among several other bases for disqualification that relate
235
If the person is providing
to financial, not personal, interests.
236
substantial services in a business or professional capacity, is a
237
creditor of the incapacitated person, or is employed by someone
238
else who would be disqualified, the person may not be appointed.
Because the definition of a conflict of interest is unclear under this
statute, Terri’s parents could have argued that Michael’s personal
relationship warranted his removal. It is this very ambiguity,
however, that makes it impossible to say how the judge might have
ruled.
Note that the three cases examined thus far involved guardians
rather than agents, and so the surrogacy section of the AHCDA
239
Given that all three of these women were
did not apply.
relatively young and healthy before a sudden trauma placed them
in a vegetative state, it is hardly surprising that they did not have

231. 42 P.3d 1093 (Alaska 2002); see also Wolfson Report, supra note 218, at 11,
34 n.1.
232. H.C.S., 42 P.3d at 1099.
233. See Schiavo I, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
234. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.145(b)(3) (2004).
235. § 13.26.145.
236. § 13.26.145(b)(1).
237. § 13.26.145(b)(2).
238. § 13.26.145(b)(4).
239. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 653–54 (N.J. 1976); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988); Schiavo I, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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appointed healthcare agents. It should also not be surprising that
at least two of them already had guardians,240 for the simple reason
that in the Cruzan and Schiavo cases, the family members in
question waited for a number of years before petitioning the court
241
to remove life support. In the meantime, a myriad of medical and
other decisions had to be made, so that guardianship would have
been a normal and expected action, even if the thought of
removing life support was on no one’s mind at the time. For
instance, approximately 50% of patients who are diagnosed as
being in a vegetative state one month after the injury will recover
242
Therefore, if the patient is in a
consciousness within a year.
vegetative or minimally conscious state, as opposed to being
comatose, there will almost certainly be significant delays before
the issue of removing life support comes to the fore.
There can be no surrogate under Alaska law if a guardian is
243
already appointed and available. Thus, surrogates are unlikely to
make life-support decisions for patients in a vegetative state
because, by the time life support decisions are being made, the
patient will likely have a guardian. A variety of non-medical
decisions need to be made for someone in a vegetative or
minimally conscious state, so a guardian would be appointed to
make those decisions. A guardianship petition may be dismissed if
244
there are feasible alternatives to guardianship, and a surrogate
would be a feasible alternative to guardianship if only medical
decisions need to be made.
Another potential problem with the AHCDA exists. Assume
hypothetically that no one, including Michael Schiavo, had been
appointed Terri’s guardian. Suppose instead he argued for
surrogate status under the AHCDA. In the absence of a
designation by the patient as to whom she wanted as her surrogate,
the first priority for appointment goes to the spouse, “unless legally
245
One might naturally assume that because he had
separated.”
moved in with another woman, fathered two children by her, and
began referring to her as his fiancée, Michael Schiavo would be
considered legally separated from his wife. That would be an
incorrect assumption. Legal separation has a specific meaning in
240. In the Quinlan case, the issue of termination of life support came up in the
initial litigation over the appointment of a guardian. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651.
241. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411, 413; Schiavo I, 780 So.2d at 177–78.
242. The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent
Vegetative State, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1572, 1572 (1994).
243. § 13.52.030(a).
244. § 13.26.113(d).
245. § 13.52.030(c)(1).
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Alaska, and it is not based on the general facts of the case, but
rather on whether a decree of legal separation has been entered
246
Because there was no legal separation
under section 25.24.450.
decree between Michael and Terri Schiavo, Michael would still
have been entitled to priority to be the surrogate, despite his
conflicted circumstances. The primary healthcare provider could
247
decline to comply with specific decisions made by Michael, but
not with his right to be the surrogate. Of course the hospital, the
parents, or any other interested person could petition for judicial
relief under section 13.52.140 or guardianship under section
13.26.105.
Assuming Michael was able to maintain his position as
guardian, we would again return to the statutes to determine his
authority to consent to withdrawal of life-saving medical
procedures. As in the Cruzan case, the question would be whether
the procedures in question serve only to prolong the dying process
and offer no reasonable expectation of effecting a temporary or
permanent cure or relief from the illness or condition being
248
Suppose for the sake of argument no one had been
treated.
appointed guardian, and Michael was seeking to act under
surrogacy authority. He would have to establish, among other
249
things, that his wife was in a state of permanent unconsciousness,
and again there is the question of whether she experienced
250
sensation. Terri’s autopsy report indicated that, toward the end of
251
her life, she was given acetaminophen, but it is unclear whether
this was for pain, fever, or inflammation. If the definition of
permanent unconsciousness in the AHCDA is interpreted literally,
surrogates will not be able to terminate life support for patients
such as Nancy Cruzan and Terri Schiavo. The statute states that
thought, sensation, purposeful action, social interaction, and
awareness of self and the environment must be absent for the
252
A literal
person to be found permanently unconscious.
interpretation means that each of those five prongs must be absent,
so that if the patient still experiences sensation, they are not

246. § 25.24.450.
247. § 13.52.030(h).
248. § 13.26.150(e)(3).
249. This state is known as a “qualifying condition.” § 13.52.390(36).
250. See AUTOPSY REPORT OF THERESA SCHIAVO, CASE # 5050439 1 (June 13,
2005), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/schiavo/61305autopsyrpt.pdf.
251. Id.
252. § 13.52.390(31)(b).

110805 03_KIRK.DOC

2005]

1/3/2006 4:50 PM

ALASKA HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT

245

permanently unconscious.253 However, under Illinois law, sensation
is interpreted as consciousness, and under this interpretation, a
surrogate would be able to direct removal of a feeding tube for a
254
person in a vegetative state. Furthermore, given that the majority
of doctors believe it is appropriate to remove feeding tubes for
255
patients in vegetative states and the possibility of “doctor
shopping” by the guardian, there is little doubt that Terri Schiavo’s
fate would not have changed under the AHCDA.
D. Sun Hudson
If the Quinlan, Cruzan, and Schiavo cases look remarkably
similar from a factual viewpoint, the sad case of Sun Hudson is
256
Sun was born with a genetic condition called
quite different.
thanatophoric dysplasia, a form of dwarfism, which includes a
257
narrow chest, small ribs, and underdeveloped lungs. Infants born
with this condition, if they are not stillborn, usually die shortly after
258
This condition normally restricts
birth from respiratory failure.
259
the growth of the rib cage so that the baby slowly suffocates.
Texas Children’s Hospital, where Sun was born, placed him on a
ventilator, but informed his mother that further treatment would
be futile, merely prolonging the inevitable, and that in their view he
260
should be removed from the ventilator. His mother refused, and
the matter ended up in probate court, where the judge eventually
ruled that five-month old Sun could be taken off life support,
253. Sensation is defined as the activity of the sensors, or the immediate result
of this activity before the combination with other data. THE NEW LEXICON
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, ENCYCLOPEDIC EDITION
907 (1989).
254. See Keiner v. Cmty. Convalescent Ctr., 549 N.E.2d 292, 298 (Ill. 1998)
(stating in part that a patient in a persistent vegetative state is unable to purposely
interact with stimulation from his environment).
255. Payne, supra note 84, at 107, Table 4.
256. Associated Press, Infant Born with Fatal Defect Dies After Being Taken
Off Life Support, ABC13.NET, Mar. 15, 2005, http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/news/
031405_local_baby1.html; Associated Press, Houston Mother Loses Fight to Keep
Baby on Life Support, NBC5.COM, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.nbc5.com/
health/428633/detail.html; Rick Casey, No Villains in This Sad Story,
HOUSTONCHRONICLE.COM, Feb. 23, 2005, http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/
ssistory.mpl/metropolitan/casey/3047420.
257. Infant Born with Fatal Defect Dies After Being Taken Off Life Support,
supra note 257.
258. Rick Casey, supra note 256.
259. Id.
260. Houston Mother Loses Fight to Keep Baby on Life Support, supra note
256.
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despite his mother’s objections.261 Under Texas law, the mother
was allowed ten days to find another hospital willing to take over
262
care. When the mother was unable to find another hospital, Sun
was removed from the ventilator, and he died a few breaths later,
263
on March 15, 2005.
264
The AHCDA applies only to adults, so under Alaska law,
Sun’s mother would act on her baby’s behalf under general
265
Nonetheless, the
parental rights rather than as a surrogate.
hospital could have determined that keeping Sun on a respirator
would constitute “medically ineffective health care,” which is care
that “cannot cure the illness, cannot diminish its progressive course,
266
and cannot effectively alleviate severe discomfort and distress.”
This would have been a questionable determination, however,
because the respirator diminished the progressive course of the
malady by prolonging Sun’s life.
Another way in which the Alaska and Texas procedures
diverge is that under Alaska law, if the mother chose to seek a
transfer, the hospital would have had to provide continuing care
267
By contrast, there is a ten-day
until the transfer was effected.
268
time limit under Texas law. In Alaska, the search for a hospital
willing to take the child could go on indefinitely.
Alternatively, the hospital could have turned to section
13.52.140, under which it could have requested the superior court
to direct a healthcare decision. At that point, the court has the
dilemma noted earlier: should it review the surrogate’s decision
under the standards provided in the AHCDA or under the
standards provided in the guardianship act? The judicial relief
section of the AHCDA appears to direct the court to the
269
guardianship act. However, another question arises as to whether
to consult the section on guardians of minors or guardians of
incapacitated persons. The statute does not provide guidance

261. Casey, supra note 256.
262. Id.
263. Infant Born with Fatal Defect Dies After Being Taken Off Life Support,
supra note 256.
264. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Evans v. Taggart, 88 P.3d 1078 (Alaska 2004).
265. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.030(a) (2004).
266. § 13.52.060(f).
267. § 13.52.060(g)(2).
268. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046(e) (Vernon 2002).
269. The AHCDA states that “[a] proceeding under this section is governed by
AS 13.26.165–13.26.320.” § 13.52.140. These sections are a part of the
guardianship statutes.
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because it mistakenly directs that the statute on conservatorships
be used.270 Understandably, the statute on minor guardianships
does not address termination of life support beyond generally
271
authorizing the guardian to facilitate medical care and treatment.
The article regarding incapacitated persons, which does address
termination issues, is not limited to adults and can apply to any
272
incapacitated person. If the court turns to this article, it may hold
that a guardian can consent to withholding life-saving medical
procedures, as long as those procedures serve only to prolong the
dying process, under section 13.26.150(e)(3). However, nothing in
the guardianship statutes suggests that the judge may order the
withholding of life-sustaining procedures if the guardian does not
want them withheld.
On the other hand, if the judge interprets the section of the
AHCDA which states that “[a] proceeding under this section is
governed by” the guardianship statutes as merely referring to the
procedure, then it would look to the AHCDA for the standards to
be applied in determining whether life support should be
terminated. However this is a stretch, not only because section
13.52.140 does not refer to procedure, but rather a proceeding, and
the AHCDA does not appear to contemplate that the decisions be
273
made by a judge. If a judge heard a case similar to that of baby
Sun’s, the judge would have to determine whether the condition is
“incurable or irreversible,” whether “without administration of lifesustaining procedures death would result in a short period of time,”
whether “there is no reasonable prospect of cure or recovery,” and
whether “the condition imposes severe pain or an inhumane
274
burden on the patient.” Assuming the other conditions were met,
the court might nonetheless have a difficult time finding that there
would be an “inhumane burden” on the baby, who was apparently
not in any particular pain and breathing reasonably well on the
ventilator.
Assuming the judge would not find an inhumane burden, this
would have left the hospital with one remaining alternative: it could
petition the court to appoint someone other than the mother as the
270. Section 13.52.140 points to sections 13.26.165-.320, part of the guardianship
statutes covering conservatorships.
271. § 13.26.070(3).
272. § 13.26.090.
273. See § 13.52.030(a).
274. This is the definition of a “terminal condition” under section 13.52.390(42).
Life-sustaining procedures may be withheld or withdrawn from a patient with a
“qualifying condition.” § 13.52.045. The definition of “qualifying condition”
includes a “terminal condition.” § 13.52.390(36).
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child’s guardian, hoping that the appointee would be more likely to
agree with its position.
However, section 13.26.045 allows
appointment of a guardian for a minor only if all parental rights of
custody have been terminated or suspended by circumstances or a
prior court order. None of those conditions occurred in this case.
Therefore, regardless of the hospital’s position, it is likely Sun
Hudson would have lived a little while longer under the AHCDA.
E. Ora Mae Magouirk
In April 2005, at the height of the Schiavo controversy, one of
the hot topics of discussion on the Internet was the unusual case of
a widow who was allegedly being starved to death in a hospice.
Unlike the previous cases, it is not possible to conclusively state the
275
However, for purposes of this Article,
facts of this case.
ascertaining the precise facts from among the multiple versions is
unnecessary. Therefore, the following version has been pieced
together by combining the various sources, with no representation
of accuracy.
Ora Mae Magouirk was an eighty-one year old woman living
in Alabama. Because she was a widow without any surviving
children, her granddaughter helped take care of her by running
errands and bringing her food. The granddaughter also had a
general power of attorney. Magouirk had a living will, which said
275. Only a few articles appeared in the mainstream press, none of which were
able to determine which side of the controversy gave the most accurate facts.
Most of the information available on the case comes from Internet news sources
that have a particular philosophical perspective and whose information, therefore,
is necessarily suspect. See, e.g., Sarah Foster, Closest Kin Prevented from Visiting
Apr.
12,
2005,
‘Grandma,’
WORLDNETDAILY.COM,
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=43763;
Sarah
Foster, Granddaughter Yanks Grandma’s Feeding Tube, WORLDNETDAILY.COM,
Apr. 7, 2005, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID
=43688; Mark A. R. Kleiman, Mae Magouirk: Is There a Reporter in the House?,
MARK A. R. KLEINMAN: A WEBLOG FOR THE REALITY-BASED COMMUNITY, Apr.
8, 2005, http://www.markarkleiman.com/archives/_/2005/04/mae_magouirk_is_
there_a_reporter_in_the_house.php; Mark A. R. Kleiman, Magouirk Update,
MARK A. R. KLEINMAN: A WEBLOG FOR THE REALITY-BASED COMMUNITY, Apr.
11, 2005,
http://www.markarkleiman.com/archives/schiavo_/2005/04/magouirk
_update.php; Denis O’Hayer, Georgia Case Mirrors Schiavo Battle, 11
ALIVE.COM, Apr. 8, 2005, http://www.11alive.com/help/search/search_article
.aspx?storyid=61478; Charles Yoo, Illness Splits Woman’s Kin, THE ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Apr. 12, 2005, http://www.ajc.com/hp/content/metro/
0405/12illness.html; Maria Vitale Gallagher, Woman’s Starvation Stopped in a
Apr.
11,
2005,
Terri
Schiavo-Like
Situation,
LIFENEWS.COM,
http://www.lifenews.com/bio905.html.
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that nutrition and hydration were to be withheld only if she were
either comatose or in a vegetative state. In March 2005, Magouirk
was hospitalized for an aortic problem, reportedly lucid at the time.
The granddaughter had her transferred to a hospice, telling other
relatives they should let her pass away, and apparently not telling
the hospice about the living will. Magouirk was only able to eat
foods such as Jell-O and chips of ice. On learning of this,
Magouirk’s sister and brother insisted on placement of a feeding
tube, and made arrangements for Magouirk to be transported to
the hospital at the University of Alabama at Birmingham to begin
the procedure. However, while they were at the hospice awaiting
her transport to the hospital, the granddaughter went to court and
obtained an emergency order appointing herself as guardian; she
again refused to have the feeding tube inserted. A few days later,
after hearing from Magouirk’s siblings, the probate judge ordered
that she be “adequately fed” pending a determination of her
condition, which was to be based on the opinion of three mutually
agreed-upon neurologists. There is no available record of the final
decision. Magouirk reportedly died a few months later at a
relative’s home.
Perhaps the first and foremost lesson one can learn from the
Magouirk case is that having an advance directive is useless if one’s
medical providers are unaware of it. In Alaska, most of the major
hospitals have now set up directories that will store copies of
276
In addition,
advance directives for those who provide one.
declarants should provide a copy to any physician they see on a
regular basis and any surgeon or specialist who may be treating
them for a particular problem (and to the declarant’s lawyer, of
course).
In the Magouirk case, the granddaughter’s power of attorney
did not include medical decision-making, and the living will
apparently did not include appointment of an agent for health-care
decisions. Therefore, under the AHCDA, the hospice would have
referred to section 13.52.030, the section on surrogates. The
sources reflect conflicting information on Magouirk’s ability to
express herself at the time she arrived at the hospice. However, if
she had been able to express an opinion, she could have designated
a surrogate and informed her healthcare providers of her choice.
Assuming that she could not express an opinion, the healthcare
providers would have looked to the priority list to see who should

276. Confirmed by phone calls by author’s staff to major hospitals in Alaska.
Telephone interviews by author’s staff with Providence Hospital, Alaska Regional
Hospital, and Alaska Native Medical (July 19-22, 2005).
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make decisions on her behalf.277 Magouirk did not have a surviving
spouse, adult child, or parent, but the fourth priority is an adult
sibling. Magouirk had two adult siblings. Either her sister or
brother could have stepped forward and claimed the position of
surrogate, or they could have both done so and would have had to
278
reach consensus. Had they both stepped forward and not been
279
able to agree on decisions, the doctor would have broken the tie.
Either way, the sister and brother were both inclined to have a
feeding tube inserted, and there is no reason to think that doing so
would have been so far outside generally accepted healthcare
standards that the provider would have been entitled to refuse.
Presumably, the tube would have been inserted.
Could the granddaughter nonetheless have gone to probate
court and received an emergency guardianship order? After all, a
surrogate may make decisions only if a guardian has not been
280
appointed, and while an agent may, in certain circumstances, be
281
able to overrule a guardian, there is nothing in the AHCDA that
suggests that a surrogate can overrule a guardian.
The
granddaughter could have applied for temporary guardianship
under section 13.26.140, and if she convinced the court that an
emergency order was necessary to protect the respondent from
282
serious injury, illness, or disease, she could have obtained it. The
maneuver may or may not have worked. The granddaughter would
have had to file a petition that provides the names and addresses of
“the individuals most closely related to the respondent by blood or
283
marriage.” This would have required her to provide the names of
the brother and sister and take the risk that the court would contact
them and learn that they were opposed to her guardianship.
The guardianship statutes also have a priority list, which is
284
similar to, but not identical to, the list in the AHCDA. One of
the differences between the two lists could be absolutely critical in
this case: the surrogate list begins with a spouse, then an adult
child, then a parent, then an adult sibling, and finally an adult who
285
The
has exhibited special care and concern for the patient.
277. § 13.52.030(c).
278. See § 13.52.030(f).
279. See id.
280. See § 13.52.030(a).
281. § 13.52.040(b).
282. See § 13.26.140(d).
283. See § 13.26.105(b)(6).
284. The guardianship priority list is at section 13.26.145(d); the surrogate
preference list is at section 13.52.030(c).
285. § 13.52.030(c).
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guardianship list begins with the spouse, then an adult child or
parent, then a relative with whom the incapacitated person has
resided for more than six months, then a relative or friend who has
demonstrated a sincere longstanding interest in the welfare of the
286
As adult siblings, the brother and sister
incapacitated person.
would have had priority over the granddaughter for appointment as
surrogates, but for guardianship appointment, the siblings would
have been on the same priority level as relatives who had
demonstrated a sincere, longstanding interest in the welfare of the
incapacitated person. In fact, the granddaughter might have been
considered higher on the list than the siblings, because while she
was not actually living with Magouirk, she had apparently been
helping to provide for her for some time.
Regardless of who was appointed as guardian (if the probate
court even found a necessity for guardianship given the availability
of a surrogate), the court would have still had the authority to
287
review and amend a decision of the guardian and, therefore,
could have directed the insertion or withholding of the feeding
tube. The court would have considered whether the procedures in
question would “serve only to prolong the dying process and offer
no reasonable expectation of effecting a temporary or permanent
288
cure of, or relief from, the illness or condition being treated . . . .”
While Magouirk was elderly and had a potentially dangerous aortic
condition, the information at hand suggests that she was not
terminal, and, therefore, would probably not have qualified for
cessation of life-sustaining treatment. She was also not in a
vegetative state, so she would have experienced severe discomfort
from being given inadequate nutrition and hydration, which would
have unquestionably factored into a judge’s decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the spring of 2005, the news of the moment was the death of
Terri Schiavo by dehydration. Congress passed legislation to stop
289
this action in a late-night session, and numerous writs, cases, and
appeals were filed. In the end, judicial authority won out over
congressional dissent. Ms. Schiavo’s feeding tube was disconnected
and she slowly died. In the meantime, the media and the internet
buzzed with stories about a deformed baby in Houston and an

286.
287.
288.
289.

§ 13.26.145(d).
See § 13.26.125(a)(1).
See § 13.26.150(e)(3).
Terry Schiavo Law, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
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elderly woman in a hospice in Georgia. End-of-life decisions were
the water-cooler topic of the season.
The majority public sentiment seems to have been that Ms.
290
Schiavo should not have been “starved to death,” an observation
supported by the legislative response. In the U.S. House of
Representatives, where the vote was recorded, 203 representatives
voted in favor of the bill to provide her with specific relief and only
291
58 representatives voted against the bill. The U.S. Senate passed
the same bill on a voice vote, and the President promptly signed it.
Based on the overwhelming legislative response, one could assume
that the majority of Americans seem to be opposed to removal of a
feeding tube from a patient in a minimally conscious or vegetative
state.
292
Nonetheless, in Alaska, the recently passed AHCDA would,
in all likelihood, have resulted in Terri Schiavo’s death by
dehydration, just as it actually happened in Florida. Despite the
fact that the AHCDA says that it establishes a presumption in
293
favor of life, the specifics and the legislative history allow plenty
of leeway to terminate life support, including removal of a feeding
tube in circumstances in which most people believe it would be
294
wrong to do so.
The AHCDA needs to be revisited, regardless of the
philosophical position from which one approaches these issues.
For example, the misdirection in section 13.52.140, in which the
reader is referred to the conservatorship statutes instead of the
guardianship statutes; the dichotomy between what the form
suggests about the right to direct that life support be terminated
295
296
even if one is pregnant and the statute that does not allow it;

290. Ninette Sosa, et al., Schiavo’s Feeding Tube Removed, CNN.com, Mar. 18,
2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/18/schiavo.brain-damaged/.
291. 151 CONG. REC. H1728 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005). One hundred seventyfour representatives did not vote. Id.
292. At present, the Senate is Republican-controlled by a margin of twelve to
eight, and the House of Representatives by twenty-six to fourteen.
Committee/Member Information of the Alaska State Legislature,
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/commbr_info.asp? session=24 (last visited Sept.
26, 2005). The Governor is Republican as well. Republican Governors
Association, http://www.rga.org/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
293. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.120(a) (2004).
294. See supra notes 152–55 and accompanying text.
295. The sample Advance Health Directive given in the statutes has a section
that seems to allow a person to enter end-of-life directives in case that person is
unconscious and pregnant. § 13.52.300, pt. 2, item (6)(E).
296. § 13.52.055(b).
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and the possible misconception as to what “legally separated”
means in the context of a spouse taking control as a surrogate,297 all
need to be clarified.
When it addresses these technical concerns, the legislature
should also consider whether the actual effect of the AHCDA will
accomplish its purpose. The AHCDA purports to be based on the
right to self-determination, combined with a concern for the
298
Instead, it has been infused with enough
sanctity of life.
loopholes such that doctors and surrogates can terminate lives,
even of the unwilling, based on their own philosophical convictions.
Although many people espouse the philosophy that those who
cannot lead a productive life are “better off dead,” this is not the
philosophy the legislature appears to have endorsed, at least
299
explicitly, when it passed the AHCDA. If the legislature did not
intend this result, it should consider a number of changes to the
AHCDA, including a re-examination of whether the definition of
“permanent unconsciousness” should include those in a vegetative
state.

297. § 13.52.030(c)(1).
298. See § 13.52.010.
299. See id.

